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    1 Introduction1
What is the eect of trade-cost reductions on the intensive and extensive margins of trade?
In this work we address this issue by analyzing the impact of trade costs through a policy
variable, taris, and using the worldwide multilateral tari reduction resulting from the Uruguay
Round (UR), as a policy change.
Answering the previous question is at the core of recent results in trade literature. By
introducing heterogeneity across rms, recent trade models (Melitz 2003 and Chaney 2008)
show that only some rms are able to export. This, in turn, generates two margins of trade: the
extensive and intensive margins. The rst one is dened by the number of rms that export, the
second one by the average export ow by rm. The main predictions of these models are related
to the eects of variable and xed trade costs on both margins. Our question is particularly
interesting from a policy point of view. Recent contributions (Bustos (2009)) have shown that,
after a trade liberalization, exporters tend to adopt a more ecient technology. This may
create a new channel for productivity upgrading. Eaton et al. (2008) nd that new Colombian
exporters start exporting by shipping very low volumes. However, those who survive expand
very rapidly and, after a few years, account for almost half of total export expansion in that
country. Those ndings suggest that, if a reduction in taris aects aggregate trade mainly
through the extensive margin, its long-term eect can be magnied. On the other hand, if the
eect channels more through the intensive margin, the economy experiences a reallocation of
resources toward the incumbent exporters. In this case a relevant policy could be to allow for
a higher degree of exibility in the labour market in order to ease the reallocation process.
Some recent papers, like Crozet & Koenig (2007), address the relation between trade costs
and trade margins empirically, relying on distance to assess the impact of variable costs. The
main novelty of our work is to use taris to study the eect of variable trade costs in a micro
data context. Thereby, we can address interesting econometric as well as trade-related issues.
First, considering taris instead of simply distance, we are able to implement econometric panel
methods. By controlling for country-sector specic xed eects, we measure the within eect
of a change in taris on both trade ows and their margins, whereas previous studies could
only use cross-section estimation. Thereby, it allows us to get rid of the well-known problem
that distance can also proxy for taste or cultural dissimilarity and a range of other cultural
or historical considerations. Second, taris are one of the main trade policy instruments in
the hand of governments and eort is devoted to policy programmes aimed at reducing taris.
Thus, the parameter of interest is the elasticity of trade ows and trade margins to taris,
rather than to distance. Third, most theoretical trade models introduce trade costs through
taris and perform comparative static analysis by letting taris change. In this perspective,
our analysis keeps up with the theoretical literature to a larger extent than previous ones.
We study the response of French rms to the worldwide reduction in taris implemented
within the framework of the Uruguay Round in the end of 1994. We study France among
European countries due to the availability of detailed rm-level data, from the French Customs
(Douanes), which allow us to address this issue using a 3-dimensional panel. We use information
on the exports of French rms for 57 sectors to 147 destinations in a time period ranging from
1The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect those of the Bank of Italy or
INSEE. We are grateful to Paula Bustos, Matthieu Crozet, H el ene Erkel-Rousse, Gino Gancia, Guy Laroque,
Joao Santos Silva, Massimo Sbracia, Silvana Tenreyro and Farid Toubal for insightful comments.
51993 to 2002. We use the multilateral agreement promoted by the Uruguay Round because it
has been the only large scale multilateral tari reduction in the last decades.
Merging the French rm-level dataset with TRAINS tari data (collected by WTO, IDB
(Inter-American Development Bank) and the World Bank), we can exploit the taris imposed
on French products to identify the elasticity of trade ows with respect to taris on both margins
of trade. In fact, the structure of the Douanes dataset, which species the export destination
by rm and product, allows us to precisely match a ow with its tari. While a few studies did
it on the import side, we are the rst, up to our knowledge, to examine the export side, which
is made possible by the structure of the Douanes database. This feature is particularly relevant
in the case of France since tari reductions in the 1990s were less signicant on the import side
than on the export side.
We use a gravity equation approach and show gradually how our results are modied as we
depart from the standard specication. We show that the panel dimension is crucial for the
results. When we ignore it and perform an OLS pooled cross-section estimation we nd that
both margins are signicant and that each explains half of the total eect of taris on trade. We
show that this result is robust to the introduction of a full set of country and sector unobserved
heterogeneity eects as well as time macro-shocks. However, when we take the panel dimension
of the data into account (within regressions), the eect on the extensive margin disappears.
Thus, more rms export where taris are lower (pooled OLS). However, the decrease in taris
(within regressions) induced by the implementation of the Uruguay Round did not push more
rms into exporting, while it increased the shipments of incumbent exporters. This result
reveals that using the average eect of taris to deduct the eect of a trade liberalization
episode may be highly misleading. In fact a reduction in taris only helps those rms that
already export, leaving small non-exporters aside. The reason may be that small rms are
not able to cover the sunk costs of exporting with the gains from taris reduction. Whether
this is the result of the (big) magnitude of sunk costs, the (small) magnitude of the UR taris
reduction, or other impediments to the rm growth, is an interesting issue which we leave to
further research.
We address two potential biases which may aect our results. First, tari growth rates may
be endogenous. After the implementation of the UR, taris decreased without being completely
eliminated (and without reaching a predetermined level). Hence, even if tari reductions were
induced by the UR implementation, we cannot be sure that their patterns has not been shaped
by other factors. A way of controlling for this bias is to instrument the growth rate of taris.
A good instrument for the growth rate in taris is its pre-policy (pre-UR) level interacted
with a WTO participation dummy. In fact, at the sector-country level, the higher taris were
before the policy event, the more they decreased. Moreover pre-UR tari levels do not aect
the subsequent French export growth rate since they are predetermined. When we instrument
taris this way, our results do not change much, however. Second, we discuss the incidence
of the omission of zero-trade ows in our results. We propose two dierent methodologies
to deal with it: a Tobit-Honor e (1992) model and a Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
estimation proposed by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The extensive margin coecient
becomes signicant, albeit it explains less than 20% of the eect. Moreover, and in contrast
with previous ndings, this result is not robust to the inclusion of further control variables.
Our overall results suggest that the tari reductions, partly due to the Uruguay Round,
are responsible for increases in aggregate French exports ranging from 3:4% to 4:7% between
1993 and 2002, depending on the dierent econometric specications. This expansion channels
6mainly through the intensive margin, the extensive margin coecient being either insignicant
or very low.
Our paper is mainly related to the empirical literature on extensive and intensive margins.
Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004), using French rm-level data for 1986, nd that the exten-
sive margin explains much of the variations in French rm exports over all possible destinations.
Crozet and Koenig (2007), using a similar approach to ours, estimate the eect of distance on
French trade ows and on both margins. They use their estimates to recover the structural
parameters of Chaney's (2008) model. Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) (hereafter
BJRS), using US disaggregated export ows for 2000, nd that higher distance implies lower
extensive margin but higher intensive margin. Moreover, their ndings suggest that aggregate
trade relationships are more inuenced by their extensive margin than by their intensive one.
We depart from these papers insofar as we use a panel framework that allows us to control for
sector and country unobserved heterogeneity.
Surprisingly few papers have explored the impact of tari reductions on trade growth. The
rst example we are aware of is Baier & Bergstrand (2001). They estimate on bilateral trade
ows at the country level that the elasticity to taris is between -2 and -4. Using data at
the product level, Haveman, Nair-Reichert & Thursby (2003) nd an average elasticity of -1.6.
Hence, our estimate for the reaction of total trade to tari reductions lies in the usual range.
The decomposition of the eect into margins has been estimated by Debaere & Mostashari
(2005), but for the import side and using macroeconomic product margins (number of products
versus shipments per product). The closest paper is Feinberg & Keane (2009) that estimate
a structural model for export decision on rm level data for multinational corporations in US
and Canada. They nd no eect of taris on the export decision of rms.
This paper also contributes to the lively debate on the eect of WTO on world trade,
originated by Rose (2004). Applying a standard gravity approach to a set of bilateral trade
ows in long time series, Rose shows that GATT/WTO membership does not explain world
bilateral trade volumes. Since then, many papers have explored this issue, trying to gure
out what was driving these surprising ndings. Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) show that, by
controlling Rose's regression for zero ows, the GATT/WTO membership dummy turns out
to be signicant. Our results are consistent with theirs, but our main innovation with respect
to previous literature consists in using taris instead of a dummy indicating participation in
WTO. The scope of our results is dierent from that of previous studies since we do not consider
bilateral trade ows and since the time-span in our analysis is much shorter. Nevertheless, the
main concern of GATT/WTO relies on tari reduction. To this extent, our analysis is the rst
to address this issue using a continuous variable instead of a membership dummy and relying
directly on a well-dened policy change induced by GATT/WTO. Clearly, our results refer to
France only. Since the Uruguay Round aected mostly developing countries, the impact on
world trade may be even bigger. This analysis and its results are relevant as the discussion on
the Doha Round is becoming crucial in the international policy debate. In fact, we prove how
benecial the previous multilateral tari reductions have been even for a developed economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the extent of the tari
reductions induced by the Uruguay Round and the patterns of French exports between 1993
and 2002. Section 3 presents the main econometric strategy. Section 4 deals with robustness
checks. Section 5 concludes.
72 Data and descriptive analysis
In this section, we rst describe the Uruguay Round negotiation and report descriptive
evidence to claim that it is a convenient policy change for our analysis. Then, we briey describe
the Douanes data and report preliminary evidence on the eects of gravity determinants on
aggregate French exports.
2.1 The Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, promoted by the GATT, began in
1986 and ended in 1994 with the signature of the \Marrakesh Declaration" by 117 countries.
The contents of the agreement include many topics like lowering trade barriers, establishing a
more eective dispute settlement system, giving new rules on trade in services, on intellectual
property rights and on anti-dumping, subsidies and import safeguards. Thus, according to
the signed Declaration, this negotiation \ marked a historic step towards a more balanced and
integrated global trade partnership".
In this paper we focus on the reduction in taris endorsed by the UR. The agreement refers
to the bound taris which are the maximum allowed level of import duties. These are the level
of taris on a product that a country commits not to increase. In fact, once a rate has been
ocially bound, it can only be raised through a further negotiation with the most concerned
countries and could result in a compensation for their loss of trade. In particular, during UR
negotiations, each country agreed either to bind a tari rate at a certain level or to reduce the
already existing bound.2
However in practice many countries, expecially developed ones, do not apply their bound
tari rates but much lower duties, which are called applied taris. In this paper we measure
the extent of taris reduction induced by the UR directly with applied taris. There are many
reasons to do this. First, many developing countries committed to bound rates that were not
bounded before the negotiation. Thus, for these countries, it is not possible to evaluate the
eect of the UR considering bound taris. Second, even if the UR was the result of individual
country commitments with each trading partner,3 the reduction of bound taris was in most
cases similar across countries and products, being in the range of 30% of the initial level. This
would not allow us to have an important variation for the econometric analysis.4
The timing of tari reductions agreed upon by each Member was implemented, on average,
in ve equal rate reductions from 1995 to 2000.5
We measure tari reductions faced by the European Union using applied ad-valorem taris
at the product-country-time level contained in the TRAINS-WTO database.6 The relevant
2The documents in the WTO ocial web page report that \developed countries increased the number of
imports whose tari rates are 'bound' (committed and dicult to increase) from 78% of product lines to 99%.
For developing countries, the increase was considerable: from 21% to 73%."
3There is no legal agreement that sets out the targets for tari reductions (e.g. by what percentage they
were to be cut as a result of the Uruguay Round).
4In fact we nd that the correlation among the change in applied and in bound taris is positive, but not
big enough to allow for a further analysis using bound taris.
5Except if it is otherwise stated in a Member's Schedule. In section 4 we use more carefully the dierent
countries' timing of implementation of the UR.
6In TRAINS data set disaggregate product-line taris are averaged out at the correspondent sector level.
The average may be either simple either weighted by the country export/import share. Here we use simple
8tari data for this paper cover 147 countries, 57 manufacturing products and years ranging
from 1993 to 2002.7 Therefore the covered time period begins 2 years before the UR and
ends 2 years after its implementation. Products are classied according to the French 3-digit
NES (Nomenclature  Economique de Synth ese). The data, however, are not available for all
the country-product-year observations: therefore the panel is unbalanced.8 In what follows we
provide a detailed description of the variation of taris data before and after the implementation
of the UR.
Figure 1 shows the change in taris induced by the UR plotted against their initial level in
1993-1994.9 Each point represents the tari set by a French trade partner on a specic sector.
The left-hand side panel shows the relation for all available country-sector pairs for which the
TRAINS data set reports the observation before 1994.
We observe interesting features. First, initial tari levels show a high dispersion, ranging
between 0 to a maximum of 100%, with a median observation below 20%. Second, Figure 1
suggests a downward sloped relation between tari changes and their initial levels. Not only
taris decreased, but they decreased more where they were higher. Thus the initial level of
taris may be a good predictor of their decrease. However the taris did not simultaneously
drop to zero, nor to a predetermined level. In fact, the observations do not strictly lie on a line
going through the origin. This could weaken the interpretation of UR as an exogenous policy
experiment since each country strategically decreased its taris in order to keep the desired
protection structure. This observation strongly inspires our econometric analysis. Third, there
are some country-sector pairs for which taris actually increased. Over 2,699 country-sector
tari observations reported both for the initial and nal periods, 416 increased between 1993
and 2002, suggesting that, in some cases, the UR did not actually manage to enforce their
reductions.
Deeper investigation shows an interesting pattern: tari increases mainly concern countries
which do not belong to the WTO, countries in Mercosur and the \Processed Agricultural"
sectors. While the rst pattern is not surprising, the last two deserve some explanation. By
signing the Mercosur agreement in 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela
agreed on reducing taris among themselves and on setting a common external tari against
third countries. Our database suggests that taris set by Mercosur countries against the Euro-
pean Union correlate among them much more at the end of the period than at the beginning.
Moreover, this correlation is higher than the average one among all countries. This reveals
some kind of coordination among these countries in setting taris against other countries, in
conformity with the Mercosur agreement. The tari increases decided by these countries may
also be a consequence of that agreement itself. Finally, the average increase in taris in \Pro-
cessed Agricultural" sectors is also noticed by previous works that discussed the impact of the
UR in tari escalation for agricultural products,10 and concluded that a high level of protec-
average taris not to incorporate a further source of endogeneity, being total French exports the dependent
variable in the analysis. From now on we refer to these simply as \taris".
7Agricultural sectors are excluded from the analysis since they received a particular treatment from the UR
negotiations. It consists in converting import quotas (which at the time were particularly widespread in these
sectors) into tari equivalent levels and then reducing those levels by an average of 36% in the following 6 years.
8Table 8 (in appendix) reports the countries used in the analysis and indicates for which of them tari data
are available both before and after the UR. In C all sector are reported.
9Here we have either average tari in 1993 and 1994 (when they are both available), or taris in 1993 or in
1994 (when they are not available for both years).
10Tari escalation consists in setting higher taris on processed agricultural components than on their input
9tion in this sector still remains after the UR tari concession. Once we eliminate these groups
of observations, we are left with the right-hand side panel of Figure 1, where the number of
increased taris observations decreases by 71% (from 416 to 163). We dene the observations
that are not in the 3 above-mentioned categories (non-WTO members, Mercosur, \Processed
Agricultural" sector) as the UR sub-sample and we use the latter to run some robustness checks
in section 4.
Figure 2 shows a sector-aggregate version of Figure 1 for some countries. The top panel
represents two countries which are WTO-members, a less-developed and a developed one, while
the bottom panel displays respectively a country that is not a WTO-member and a country
that is a Mercosur-member. We notice how, for the Philippines and Australia, the reduction in
taris is much more in line with the UR concession scheme than for Vietnam and Argentina. For
the latter countries, on the contrary, most of the observations lie above the 0-line. This Figure
also shows how countries set higher taris on dierent sectors. The Philippines, for example,
protects sectors C (manufacture of consumers goods) to a larger extent, while Australia sets
higher taris in FE (Preparation and spinning of textile bres, weaving and nishing of textiles)
and FG (Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles).
A more formal way to show the eect of the UR on world taris is provided by Table 1.
This table reports the average taris before and after 1995 for the countries that adopted (or
not) the UR concessions (respectively countries in WTO in 1995 and outside WTO in that
year). This table displays why we can use the UR as a policy experiment: the reduction in
taris between the last year in the data and the pre-reform year was signicantly higher for the
countries that formally signed the UR concession scheme than for the others. Thus, even if we
cannot assume that the UR was the only cause for tari reductions in our sample, we have a
clear indication of its inuence on it.
2.2 French exports
We use data from the Douanes database. The latter reports import and export ows of
French rms by partner country, year, rm and sector (at the 3-digit NES level).11
Since we want to keep track of the sectors where rms export, our margins are constructed
in a non-standard way. For instance, BJRS (2007) construct their margins such that a rm
exporting two dierent products counts twice in the extensive margin. Here, it also counts
twice but in two dierent sectors,12 so that our extensive margin is more narrowly dened.
The Douanes data contain all ows that are above 1,000 euros for extra-EU trade and
above 200 euros for intra-EU trade. However, total reported ows must cover more than 97%
of the value of the national trade.13 Hence, we do not believe that these characteristics of
the data are likely to bias the results in a systematic way. We have restricted our sample to
manufacturing sectors, excluding agricultural ones, which are often treated as special cases in
products. Since one of the provision of the UR has been to transform import quotas in agricultural sectors into
more transparent taris, many countries counterbalanced the lower protection in agricultural sectors with an
increase in protectionism in \Processed Agricultural" ones.
11This decomposition represents 60 manufacturing sectors.
12It counts once in each sector if the products are considered as pertaining to dierent sectors and once if
both products are pertaining to the same sector.
13These are the current data requirements according to Eurostat. The actual coverage was higher for the
period under analysis. We control for potential coverage variations in the empirical analysis by introducing time
xed eects. The number of exporters is understated because small ows are not reported.
10tari setting and multilateral discussions. Services are also excluded since trade strategies may
dier substantially from those in manufacturing sectors.14
The rst thing to notice is that France does not export for all sectors to all destinations.
Figure 3 reports for each year the proportion of ows (sector  country) that are strictly
positive.15 The share of zero-ows seems to be stable in French exports across our time-span,
remaining at about 20 % of the potential ows.
We now turn to the descriptive analysis of the strictly positive ows. First, in Table 2
we present some descriptive statistics on the growth rates of each margin to show that there
is indeed much variation in their evolutions over time. The rst column of this table shows
that both margins and total trade grew over time for France. The standard deviation and the
various percentiles presented here demonstrate that, beyond the average, our sample exhibits
signicant variation in growth rates. A considerable amount of variation remains once we
control for sector and country xed eects. This is crucial since the identication of the eects
of declining taris, in the panel specications, will depend on this variation. Second, to show
that the main predictions of a gravity model apply to both trade margins, in Figure 4 we plot the
log of the total and extensive margins against GDP and distance (in log). Gravity predictions
are conrmed. We conclude that our aggregated micro-data follow the usual pattern of macro
trade ows.
3 Econometric strategy and results
In this section, we present the main results of the paper. In the rst sub-section, we estimate
the usual gravity equation. We add our main variable, taris, and show that its eect channels
through both margins in repeated cross-sections. In the second sub-section, we exploit the
panel dimension of our data and show that the eect on the extensive margin disappears.
3.1 Standard gravity regressions
We follow the decomposition used by various authors, which is hereafter reported in logs
and with all the necessary subscripts:
xjts = njts + xjts
where j denotes partner country,16 s sector and t time. xjts is the log of total export, njts
the log of the number of exporters and xjts the log of average exports per rm. Our strategy
is more comparable to Crozet & Koenig (2007) than to BJRS (2007) and Mayer & Ottaviano
(2007) since the latter authors use this framework only to give a broad description of the way
trade margins move with GDP and distance, rather than to estimate the elasticity of exports
to trade costs. They thus use aggregate data at the country level (not at the sector one) for one
year, and they further decompose the intensive margin into the number of exported products
14We keep only those rms that are considered as exporters in both Douanes and B en eces R eels Normaux
(BRN) - which report rms' balance-sheet data.
15To some extent, zero ows depend on the sector disaggregation level and on the legal threshold for reporting
a ow to the Douanes administration.
16Notice that it is not possible to carry out this analysis using bilateral trade between countries, unless one
relies on rm-level data that are comparable across countries.
11(the `product-extensive margin') and the average export ow by product and by rm (their
`intensive margin').
Let j;t;s be our variable of interest (either x, n or x). The previous authors relied on the
following regressions:
jts = 0 + 1dj + 2GDPjt + 3Zj + 4Yjt + s + t + jts (1)
The main variable of interest, the proxy for variable trade costs, is dj, which measures distance.
As usual, the previous gravity equation includes the GDP of trading partners, whereas French
GDP is collinear to the time xed eects t. The specication also includes a set of country-
time and country-specic covariates, Yj;t and Zj, respectively. The rst set contains a WTO
membership and a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) dummy.17 The second set of
controls contains a dummy for former colonies of France, a dummy for islands and another one
for landlocked countries. Finally, product and time xed eects are included.
The main problem in interpreting the distance coecient as the elasticity of trade to variable
trade costs is that one cannot control for country xed eects along with distance. Hence, this
variable may capture consumer tastes, for instance. The second problem is that distance is
only a geographic proxy for trade cost. Thus, it gives only indirect evidence on the response of
exports to changes in variable trade costs.
In this paper the measure of trade costs that we consider is, thus, taris. This allows us to
obtain the elasticity of trade (and/or of its margins) on a more proper (policy) variable. The
previous specication introducing taris becomes:
jts = 0 + 1jts + 2dj + 3GDPjt + 4Zj + 5Yjt + s + t + jts (2)
where the main variable of interest, in our analysis, is jts, the log of (1 + tjts),18 where tjts is
the tari applied in sector s from the European Union at time t by country j.
Using the fact that our variable trade costs measure varies along three dimensions, we can
further replace all time-invariant country characteristics by country xed-eects, j:
jts = 0 + 1jts + 2GDPjt + 3Yjt + j + s + t + jts (3)
For a matter of comparison, we report results for each of the 3 previous specications (without
taris, with taris, with taris and country xed-eects) and for each of the margins (total,
extensive and intensive) in table 3. First, in columns (1) to (3), we nd the usual results of
the gravity equation for total trade, as well as for the intensive and extensive margins. These
results are in line with expectations: partner GDP has a positive eect on French trade, while
distance has a negative impact on it. Being an ex-French colony or an island increases French
exports, while being landlocked decreases them. The WTO membership dummy coecient
17GSP consists in a special unilateral tari concession that industrialized countries grant to developing coun-
tries and that is not subject to the \Most Favored Nation" (MFN) clause of the WTO. Thus GSP exempts
WTO member countries from MFN for the purpose of lowering taris for the least developed countries without
having to do so for richer ones. Since countries joined WTO and obtained GSP status at various times, both
variables are time-varying.
18The parameter jts that enters multiplicatively in the usual model, e.g. Chaney (2008), is equal to (1+tjts)
where t denotes the ad-valorem tari.
12is positive and signicant, like in Mayer & Ottaviano (2007) and in Helpman et al. (2008).
Interestingly, having a GSP agreement with France decreases total trade.19
When we introduce taris (column (4) to (6)) we nd that the elasticity of distance does
not change much, and the elasticities to tari are negative and signicant at the 1% level. The
eect of taris on exports channels slightly more through the extensive margin than through
the intensive margin. All the coecient estimates have similar magnitudes and signs except
for that on GSP, which is now positively related to the intensive margin.20 Finally notice that,
in this specication, the R2 is higher (since we have included a signicant variable) but the
number of observations is denitely lower since, in the TRAINS dataset, many taris are not
reported.
Once we control for country xed eects, in columns (7) to (9), the tari coecients are still
negative and signicant but of a lower magnitude. The reason may be that we now control for
the eect of some omitted country-level variable, which could be negatively linked with taris
and positively linked with exports (for instance, diplomacy, tastes, preferences, ...). However,
in this specication, WTO membership positively explains trade only through the extensive
margin. Results in columns (7) to (9) suggest that a reduction in taris of 1 p.p. from 10% to
9% increases total trade by 1.5 %,21 the extensive margin by 0.8 % and the intensive margin
by 0.7 %. These coecients imply that the contribution of tari reductions to the growth rate
of total French exports is 3.4 %.22
In columns (10) to (12) we control for the average tari that each country sets toward the
rest of the world (in each sector and year).23 This variable aims to solve a potential bias in
our regressions coming from trade diversion. In fact, since the liberalization considered here
is a multilateral one, we expect that each country decreased its taris not only toward France
but also toward all its other trade partners. Moreover, it is likely that French exports toward a
country rise if this country increases its taris toward the rest of the world (as a consequence of
trade diversion). Thus, our coecient of interest may be downward-biased (in absolute value)
in regressions where average taris toward the rest of the world are omitted. Nonetheless the
coecients of average world taris are nil and the results are unchanged. It seems that the
trade diversion eect associated with the worldwide reduction in taris was small compared
to the trade creation eect. From now on, the regressions including average world taris are
relegated to D.
Reporting Table 3 is useful in order to compare our results with standard ones on grav-
ity equations. However, our main interest lies in obtaining unbiased coecient for taris. In
the next sub-sections, we discuss potential biases on the tari coecient in the baseline re-
gressions corresponding to the columns (7)-(9) of Table 3 and we exploit more intensively our
3-dimensional panel, as well as the timing of the UR implementation, to obtain reliable unbiased
estimates.
19This seems to be the case because GSP is a good proxy for less developed countries. When we run the
same regression considering GDP per capita, the eect of GSP becomes positive for the total and the intensive
margin and not signicant for the extensive one.
20As before, if we include GDP per capita then the eect of GSP on total and intensive margins is positive,
while it becomes insignicant for the extensive one.
21The eect on the total margin, when taris go from 10% to 9% is calculated as [ln(1+0:09) ln(1+0:10)]
( 1:59) = 0:015.
22This is calculated as the variation of exports induced by taris over the actual export variation in the data.
23These data come from the TRAINS data set. The dierent number of observations in the regressions reect
the missing data on world average taris in that data set.
133.2 Within regressions
The specication in equation (3) includes one-dimensional xed eects on country, sector
and time. Country-specic xed eects control for all country characteristics that may jointly
determine the average country taris and its imports from France. Sector xed eects capture
the factors at the sector level which may inuence both taris and exports, for example the
French level of productivity in a specic sector. Finally, time xed eects control for all macro-
shocks that can explain French exports and be spuriously correlated with taris. However,
some potential concerns remain.
The rst problem concerns the omitted variables that may explain the evolution of the levels
of exports along with the levels of taris. Suppose, for example, that France started to export
more to middle-income countries and that these are exactly the countries that reduced the
most their average taris for a reason that is not specic to the WTO formation (for example
since they were facing \integration" during the 90's). This would bias our results because of an
omitted \integration" variable. The same argument holds for time-varying and sector-specic
omitted variables: for example, if the French economy grew more in a specic sector (and,
therefore, is exporting more in this sector) and this sector at the same time experienced a
liberalization of trade due to increased demand in foreign markets. To take those biases into
account, we add a full set of interactions between country and time as well as sector and time
xed-eects. Results do not change much: all three margins signicantly increase as taris
decrease, as can be seen from the rst row of Panel A in Table 4.24
The second problem with the specication in equation (3) is that it controls for sector and
country xed-eects separately. In other words, it captures the eect of variables that inuence
the average setting of taris in a given country or in a given sector. Conversely, it does not
control for the unobserved variables at the country-sector level that may explain both the setting
of taris and the imports from France. Such unobserved variables matter in shaping the levels
of taris set at each period by French trade partners in each sector. This term mainly captures
comparative advantage. One of the main concept in trade literature is that trade patterns are
determined by the structure of comparative advantage. Also the way protection policies are
chosen is mainly dependent on it. It is implausible that a country would set a uniform tari to
all its products, or that the same product would be protected in the same way throughout the
world. It is much more likely that each country sets higher taris on the sectors that it wants
to protect from French (and European) competition.
To take this bias into account, we exploit the panel dimension of the dataset and run within
regressions where the source of variation is the change in tari level applied to France within
each country-sector line (i.e. we include country-sector xed eects). The results are reported
in Panel B of Table 4. They suggest that no margin signicantly responds to a variation in
taris. The relationship between exports and taris now seems to be very noisy. In fact, this
estimation only relies on the eect of tari reductions on contemporaneous export increases.
However, it is highly probable that rms react only with some delays to the tari reductions,
resulting in an insignicant contemporaneous correlation.
To obtain reliable \within" results, we perform our analysis on a sub-sample of our data
restricted to the observations pre-UR and post-UR. Since the implementation of the UR con-
cessions took 5 years from 1995 to 2000, we only consider the observations in our data base for
24In this specic regression, time-varying country xed eects cannot be included because the number of xed
eects becomes untractable.
14the pre-UR period (either 1993 or 1994) and those for the post-UR period (either 2001 or 2002).
Our aim is to capture the medium run reaction of rms to the tari reductions. The results for
the cross-section and the within regression for the pre-post subsample are reported in Panels C
and D of Table 4. The cross-section version does not change our results: the extensive margin
explains around 50% of the total eect as in the previous specications (e.g. columns (7) to
(9) of Table 3). Moreover, the results are very similar to those in Panel A. In the \within"
specication, instead, the extensive margin is no longer signicant and the whole eect of tari
reductions within a country-sector pair channels through the change in exported quantities per
rm.25
This is the main result of the paper. First, notice that the dierence between Panels C and
D of Table 4 depends exclusively on the introduction of country-sector xed eects. Second,
from an econometric perspective, this means that the bias generated from the omission of joint
xed eects is important enough to change the signicance of the results. In fact, even if
there are more exporters where taris are lower, the decrease in taris does not push rms
into exporting.26 The economic reasons behind this result may be numerous. First, taris
may already be very low, so that their reduction is not sucient to help new rms to export.
This could be related to some non-linearity or to the existence of a threshold for the eect
of variable trade costs on the decision to export. Second, some market imperfections may, as
well, rationalize this nding (barriers to entry in domestic or foreign market, credit constraints,
and so on). If this was the case a policy intervention on these markets in the aftermath of a
trade liberalization (or a tari reduction event) could be important to maximize its positive
eects on the total exports of a country. Third, the discrepancy in results may be attributed
to the dierent eect of trade barriers in the short and in the long run. Probably in the long
run (cross-section) the number of exporters increases where taris are low, but this needs time
to be achieved. Thus, in the aftermath of a liberalization, rms are only able to change the
quantities they export but not to enter in a new market.27
To sum up, even if theoretically, by decreasing variable trade costs, some new rms should
be able to overcome the sunk cost of exporting, we do not nd the appearance of these rms.
It may be due to an empirical pattern that is inherent to the exporting decision (medium-run
decision) or to the particular economic and legal environment faced by the French rms at
home or abroad.
4 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform two important robustness checks while keeping the panel speci-
cation: endogeneity of tari changes and omission of zero ows. We again nd that the eect
25We also ran regressions in Panels C and D without crossed xed eects jt and results do not change.
Thus, we can conclude that the dierence between the results in Panels B and D does not come from the
inclusion of jt. It rather reveals the inappropriateness of regressing contemporaneous increases in exports on
contemporaneous decreases in protection.
26There may be entry of some rms and exits of others. However, we show in the companion paper (Buono
& Lalanne, 2009) that entry of new exporters is limited.
27Another explanation could be that non-exporters have been disproportionately hit by the increase in import
competition associated with the contemporaneous reduction of European import taris. However this eect
should have been rather small, since EU taris were already very low before the UR (except for agricultural
sectors, that are not included in the analysis).
15of taris on the extensive margin is either nil or very small in magnitude. Finally, we discuss
the results obtained with the various specications.
4.1 Endogeneity
In this subsection, we discuss a fundamental empirical concern in our basic specication
analysis. As noticed in the previous sections, after the implementation of the UR, taris
decreased without being completely eliminated (and without reaching a predetermined level).
This means that, even if the tari reductions were induced by the UR implementation, we cannot
be sure that this was the only reason for their reductions. In other words, we cannot rule out the
hypothesis that unobservable joint country-sector time-varying characteristics simultaneously
aected tari formation and imports from France in our time-span.28
A way to control for this bias is to instrument the growth rate of taris.29 The descriptive
analysis displayed in the rst section clearly indicates a variable that aects the growth rate
in taris: the pre-UR level of taris.30 Moreover, pre-UR tari levels should not aect by
any other channel the French export growth rate since they are predetermined. Those two
considerations imply that the pre-UR tari level is a good instrument for its (negative) growth
rate in subsequent years.
This instrument was rst used in the Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) analysis of the eect
of trade liberalization in Colombia on sectoral wage premia. As the authors explain in their
paper, political-economy models explain the patterns of protection only in a static framework
and not in a dynamic one. Thus, there is no suggestion, on the theoretical side, on the kind
of instrument one should use to address this issue. Like us, Goldberg & Pavcnik (2005) have
many periods of time at their disposal and show how the change in taris between the initial
and nal periods in their sample is strongly correlated with their initial levels. Moreover, they
argue that, in each period, the Colombian government sets the tari levels looking at some
time-varying macroeconomic variables like the world price of coee or the exchange rate. Thus,
the authors instrument the change in taris with either the pre-reform level of taris or its
interaction with coee price or the exchange rate.
Following this approach, we estimate a regression in dierence using a 2SLS procedure.
As in the previous analysis, we consider the pre-post UR sub-sample.31 In a rst step, we
instrument tari changes with their pre-UR levels, i.e. their levels in 1993. Notice that, since
we run our regressions considering only two periods of time (pre and post-UR), the instrument
and the variable to be instrumented are both country-sector specic.
To use more extensively our specic policy change, we also use a second instrument, which
28Here we have in mind the perspective of French trade-partners. Suppose, for example, that the pattern of
comparative advantage changes through time in our sample. Then both the import from France and the way
taris are set against French products may vary, partially, for that reason.
29If all the taris had dropped to zero after the UR, then their initial levels would have been a measure of the
change in taris. In this case, by controlling for all the variables that determine the level of taris, we would
have solved the problem. See Bustos (2009) for a policy change in which this scenario happens.
30Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the initial level of taris and their changes. This pattern hold if
we consider the relation between the log of the initial level of taris and their growth rates between 1993 and
2002.
31We also tried a specication regressing the bi-annual growth rate of export over the bi-annual growth rate of
taris, thus using all the time-variation in our data. That specication, however, provides insignicant results
for the same reason as the regression in level. For this reason we do not report them.
16is based on the countries and sectors subject to the higher UR concessions. The UR, in fact,
did not apply to all countries and products simultaneously. First, as previously mentioned, our
dataset contains both countries that participated in the multilateral negotiations and countries
that did not. Moreover, some countries joined the WTO after the entry into force of the Uruguay
Round concessions. For these countries the tari reduction path was postponed depending on
the year of accession. Hence, we procede in the following way: we instrument the tari growth
rate (with the pre-UR tari level) only for the countries which participated in the negotiations
before 1995. We use as an instrument a variable derived from the interaction of a WTO-
participation dummy and the pre-UR tari level for each country and sector, in order to isolate
the exogenous component of the variation in taris that is closely related to the implementation
of the UR concessions.
The regression that we run is the following:
j;s = 0 + 1[ j;s + j + s + j;s (4)
where, at the rst stage of the regression j;s is instrumented with either 1993
j;s (IV1), the
pre-UR level of taris,32 or 1993
j;s  WTOj (IV2), where WTOj is a dummy equal to 1 when a
country is a member of the GATT/WTO at the beginning of the period.
The results for regression (4) performed with OLS and 2SLS are reported in Panels A-C of
Table 5.33 The results in Panel A refer to the OLS regression for the dierentiated model. First,
notice that the coecients of this regression coincide with those of Panel D in Table 4. Second,
note that we run regressions with only two periods: thus, both methods (adding xed eects
in level or dierentiating), yield exactly the same results. Column (2) in Panel A suggests that
a reduction in taris by 1 percentage point, starting from 10%, increases total French exports
by 1.82%. This increase is completely explained by the movement in the intensive margin, the
extensive margin being insignicant.
In the second round of regressions, we instrument the dierence in taris with their initial
levels before the UR. As shown in column (1), which reports the result of the rst-stage regres-
sion, the initial level of taris signicantly impacts their variations. The coecient is negative
and the R2 is very high, as expected: we already noticed that the sector-country pairs that had
higher taris in 1993 are those who experienced the largest cuts. Moreover, the F-statistic of
the rst stage (reported in column (6)) is much higher than 10, suggesting that our instrument
is not weak. At the second-stage, we obtain negative estimates for the tari elasticities when
instrumenting by IV1. The magnitude of the coecient estimates is slightly higher than in
the previous regressions. However the tari coecient, like in Panel A, is signicant for the
intensive margin only. A reduction in taris by 1 percentage point, starting from a level of
10%, increases the average exports of French products by 2.21% compared with the previous
1.82%. The estimates are not signicantly dierent. Coecients estimated using the alternative
instrument IV2, reported in Panel C of table 5, conrm the results.
32The level in 1994 is used when the information relating to 1993 is not available in the dataset.
33Notice that in these regressions the number of observations is 2526 while, in the descriptive part, we obtained
Figure 1 using 2699 observations. The dierence in the number of observations arises from the fact that 173
sector-country couples display 0-ows in the French export data (i.e. no rm exports in those sectors and to
those countries and thus the dependent observation in regression (4) is not dened for those 173 observations).
174.2 Zero ows
In the previous analysis, we considered positive ows only, since zero ows cannot be in-
cluded in a log-log specication. Moreover, the intensive margin is not dened for sector-country
pairs without trade. Doing so, we implicitely assumed that export ows were strictly positive.
This assumption, however, is likely to downward bias our estimates due to the usual censoring
problem. Recently, many papers argued that estimating the gravity equation without taking
zero ows into account can lead to biased results.34
In the literature, this censoring problem is usually addressed using a Tobit model. However,
to apply this model to our panel gravity equation, we must solve three main issues. First, to
disentangle the eect of taris on both margins with a Tobit model, we must apply a proper
decomposition since the intensive margin exists only conditionally on the positiveness of trade
ows.35 Second, we need to transform our dependent variables to include zero ows in a log-log
specication. Third, since our specication includes xed eects, we must take care of the usual
incidental parameter problem aecting xed-eect non-linear models like the Tobit model.









where x denotes the log of the total ow, Z the vector of covariates and P(X > 0) the probability
that the ow is not nil.36 Estimating a Tobit model on the total and extensive margins allows
us to obtain the full decomposition of the elasticity of trade to taris as described above.
Therefore, our basic specication is:

jts = 0 + 1jts + jt + st + js + jts
jts = 1[
jts > 0]
where  denotes the total margin x0 = ln(1 + X) or the extensive margin n0 = ln(1 + N).
The denition of the margins has been slightly modied37 to include zero ows in the log-
log gravity. This is commonly used in the literature to perform a Tobit analysis with a log-log
specication. We use this methodology to obtain results that are comparable to the within-OLS
specication.38
Finally, country-sector xed eects are necessary in our framework and notably inuence the
results. On the other hand, the Tobit model with xed eects provides biased coecients, due
to the incidental parameter problem. We address this problem using the estimator suggested by
34Felbermayr & Kohler (2007), by allowing for zero ows, overturned the results of Rose (2004) on the absence
of eect of the WTO membership on bilateral trade; Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that the elasticity
of trade to distance changes dramatically once zero ows are taken into account. Helpman et al. (2008) argue
that omitting zero ows results in biased estimation of gravity equations.
35If the trade ow is nil, then the number of exporters is nil and the intensive margin is undened.
36This probability equals the actual proportion of non-zero trade ows in our data base, which is around 80%.
37We underline this by calling the margins x0 and n0.
38To check how the new denition of the margins aect the results, we performed the previous analysis
using x0 and n0. The results are unchanged. We also performed this same Tobit analysis using an alternative
specication for the dependent variable: we directly took the variable in logs for strictly positive ows and
specify the censoring threshold to be equal to the lowest value in the sample. The results are unchanged.
18Honor e (1992). The idea is to consider that the variation in the latent variable has a zero mean
conditional on the variation of the dependent variable. This does not require any distributional
assumption on the disturbances nor homoscedasticity, since the estimator is semi-parametric.
The estimates derived from this specication, reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6,
are of the expected signs and of a magnitude in line with the OLS estimates despite their low
signicances.39 The coecient estimates for the total margin are insignicantly dierent from
the OLS estimates. The coecient estimates for the extensive margin are hardly signicant,
suggesting a role for zero ows in channeling the growth of the extensive margin in response to
tari cuts. This is more accurately showed by the marginal eects of taris, which are obtained
using the formula in Greene (1999) and Honor e (2008). The elasticity of the total margin with
respect to tari is  2:78, which can be decomposed in  0:30 for the extensive margin and
 2:48 for the intensive margin.
We conclude that the results obtained by introducing zero ows are not very dierent from
our main within-OLS regressions of section 3. At our aggregation level, the bias induced by
ignoring zero ows is limited:40 the eect of taris on the extensive margin is very low, even
after controlling for zero ows.
However, the Tobit specication may not be the best way to assess the eect of zero ows on
our results. As we already noticed, the threshold for censoring is obtained through an artefact
(using ln(1 + X) or dening the threshold as the lowest value in the sample). But, even more
worrisome, the estimation of gravity equations in logs heavily rests on the homoskedasticity
assumption, which may not be satised. As an alternative, we follow Santos Silva & Tenreyro
(2006) who recognized the failure of the homoskedasticity assumption in gravity models in
logs.41 They suggest to handle the problem by using Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) estimation.42 Following them, we estimate this Poisson model:
 jts = exp(0 + 1jts + jt + st + js + jts)
where   denotes the total margin X (in level) or the extensive margin N (in level).
Notice that we simultaneously solve the above-mentioned concerns: xed eects are not a
problem in this context since they can easily be conditioned out of the likelihood, zero ows are
included in the regression without resorting to an artefact since we do not use a log specication,
heteroskedasticity in the error term is taken into account.43
39Note that the number of observations is now 5,398, that is twice 2,699 (=2,526 positive ows + 173 zero
ows).
40This is in line with the results obtained by Helpman et al. (2008).
41Assume that the true model is:  jts = exp(Zjts)jts where  is the vector of parameters to be estimated,
Zjts the vector of explanatory variables in logs and jts the error term. The error term is assumed to be
centered and heteroskedastic: E[jtsjZjts] = 1 and V[jtsjZjts] = f(Zjts). If the error term follows a log-
normal distribution, then the error term of the log equation is given by:jts = ln(jts) with E[jtsjZjts] =
 1
2 ln(1 + f(Zjts)2): Thus, estimating the equation in logs leads to an omitted-variable bias.
42See also Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2008) and Santos Silva & Tenreyro (2009) for other applications of this
methodology.
43Another way to deal with zero ows is suggested by Helpman et al. (2008). Their aim is to identify the
eects of their explanatory variable on the intensive margin of trade relying on bilateral trade ows. They
estimate a bilateral gravity equation adding the estimated number of exporters among regressors. To do so,
they use a Heckman selection model. In this way, they consider zero ows as arising from the decision of rms
not to export. However, this methodology does not take heteroskedasticity into account. In our exercise, we do
19The results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. The elasticities obtained
are slightly higher than those in the within-OLS benchmark regression. The main insight of
this specication is the highly signicant coecient on the extensive margin. However, the
extensive margin accounts for at most 19% of the total eect. It is hard to state if this result
comes from the inclusion of zero ows or from the new conditional variance assumption on the
residuals. The Tobit specication was performed as an intermediate step between the within
OLS and the Poisson specications. We noticed that zero ows did not change signicantly
the extensive margin coecient. Here, instead, this margin becomes signicant in the fourth
column of Table 6. Although we cannot be sure of what is behind this result, we can consider
these coecient estimates as the upper bound of the eect of tari on trade ows, both on the
total and extensive margin. Moreover, the signicance of the estimates on the extensive margin
does not seem to be robust (see Table 11 in appendix).
4.3 Other robustness checks
The TRAINS dataset provides a signicant amount of taris, albeit there are a number
of missing country-year-sector values. This sample selection may be endogenous. In fact, the
selection is likely to be driven by factors also aecting the size of the ows between countries.For
instance, less developed countries may have more missing taris because of lower resources
devoted to their statistical systems. If this were the case, the dataset would be subject to
incidental truncation. If taris are not reported for small ows, everything else being equal
(including the values of taris), then the selection of observations leads to underestimating the
elasticity of trade with respect to taris.
We tried to address this bias using a Heckman selection model. To identify the elasticities
without relying on the specic structure of the error term, we need to introduce an exclusion
variable in the selection equation. Here, we consider the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP) dummy. This variable is likely to aect the probability of reporting taris applied
to France positively. First, since the country is involved in an ocial trade agreement with
the European Union, we expect it to be more careful in reporting taris. Second, since GSP
programs are not reciprocal, there is no reason to expect France to export more to these
countries once taris, the level of development (as proxied by country-year xed eects) and
the WTO membership (also proxied by country-year xed-eects) are controlled for. However,
the results do not show any evidence of sample selection since the inverse Mills ratio turns
out to be insignicant.44 Sample selection may have disappeared since we already control
for a signicant amount of heterogeneity. But we cannot rule out that the weakness of our
identication variable drives the insignicance of the Mills ratio.
We performed other robustness checks by replicating the results on the following sub-
samples: eliminating the European Union (since its taris did not change before and after
the UR, while their imports did); considering only the UR-subset (as dened in the descrip-
tive section) to focus exclusively on the countries and sectors aected by the UR concessions;
excluding the processed-food sector; excluding the weapon sector (which is likely to be mis-
reported). The previous results hold whatever the sub-sample taken into account. We, thus,
not need to implement this methodology since we know the actual number of exporters, thus we face a censoring
problem rather than an incidental truncation one.
44Results are available upon request.
20conclude that, although there are more exporters in destination-sectors where taris are lower,
decreasing taris caused by the implementation of the Uruguay Round did not push rms into
exporting, but induced incumbent exporters to increase their ows to those destination-sectors
associated with the steepest drops in taris.
4.4 Synthesis of the results
Table 7 summarizes the elasticities to taris derived from the various econometric speci-
cations used in the paper. By ignoring the panel dimension of our dataset, we obtain that 50%
of the eect of tari reductions channels through the extensive margin.45 However, the results
dramatically change when we control for unobserved heterogeneity. The magnitude of the total
elasticity is then a bit lower, but almost all the eect channels through the intensive margin,
the extensive margin being insignicant in the benchmark within-OLS regression.
The main insight of our empirical analysis suggests that, while there are more exporters on
average where taris are low, the number of exporters does not react to a reduction in taris.
Note that our 3-dimensional panel, as well as our policy experiment with taris decreasing over
time in each sector, are essential to obtain this result.46
Table 7 also reports, for each margin, the share of the French export growth at current prices
that can be attributed to tari changes. According to our estimations, taris are a key variable,
as they contribute to a range between 3:4% and 4:7% of the total French export growth between
1993 and 2002. Interestingly, when we split the eect into both margins, we nd that taris
have a much larger impact on average sales per rm, explaining between 12% and 13.3% of the
intensive margin growth. Our results suggest that taris aect the number of new exporters
only slightly. Since some studies nd virtuous eects of being an exporter on rm performance,
this issue deserves further research to assess the reason why the number of exporters reacts so
little to signicant reductions in worldwide taris, and whether this result is specic to France.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the response of French export margins to the tari reductions
implemented after the Uruguay Round in 1995. Taris have a noticeable impact on exports:
the estimated elasticity ranges between  1:78 and  2:78 and we can explain up to 4:7% of
the total French export growth between 1993 and 2002. The breaking down into margins
reveals that the tari reductions due to the implementation of the Uruguay Round concessions
increased aggregate exports mainly by inducing incumbent exporters to ship higher volumes to
their trade partners and for the products for which taris decreased. The eect on the extensive
margin is smaller and not robust.
Our conclusions are robust to many specications, which are meant to capture potential
biases in the baseline regression (endogeneity, zero ows, biases stemming from the transfor-
mation of a level regression into a log one in the presence of heteroskedasticity). Our ndings
45A similar percentage is found by Eaton, Kortum & Kramarz (2004) who consider the eect of distance on
the exports of a cross-section of French rms.
46In a cross section or in a pooled cross section, one only captures the average eect. In a time-series
framework, one is not able to distinguish between the eect of taris and that of macro-shocks. Only with a
panel one can extrapolate the eect of tari decreases on the propensity to export.
21also suggest that WTO has an inuential role in aecting world trade. In the lively debate on
this issue, we provide evidence by using a continuous variable which varies as a consequence of
a policy change event.
From a policy viewpoint, our results can be interpreted in two distinct ways. On the one
hand, they suggest that policies aimed at reducing variable costs to trade only impact the
existing exporters. Such policies would not permit new rms to overcome the xed costs of
exporting and induce higher competition in the destination markets. This nding may have
various reasons: these variable costs are too small to matter for the rm decision, the entry into
a new export market is mainly a strategic and intertemporal issue, and so on. On the other
hand, one can think of this result as coming from frictions in some market. For example, the
variable trade costs reduction has not resulted in new exporters because the destination markets
exhibit signicant barriers to entry, or because the potential entrants are credit constrained and
cannot borrow to pay the sunk cost. Discriminating between those diagnoses requires further
work at the rm level.
22Appendix
A Countries' specic variables
Country specic variables come from the Rose database, except the GDP, which is from the Penn World
Tables. In particular, we use the following variables as controls:
 Trade partner's GDP in logarithm (ln GDP)
 Distance of trade partner capital from Paris in logarithm (ln dist)
 A binary variable equal to unity if the trade partner is a GATT or WTO member (WTO) and to zero
otherwise
 A binary variable equal to unity if the trade partner is a French former colony (Colony) and to zero
otherwise
 A binary variable equal to unity if the trade partner is an island (Island) and to zero otherwise
 A binary variable equal to unity if the trade partner is landlocked (landlocked) and to zero otherwise
 A binary variable equal to unity if the trade partner benets from a Generalyzed System of Preferences
(GSP) and to zero otherwise
B List of countries
In table 8 we report all the countries in the analysis and, for each of them, we specify a "Tari Coverage"
indicator, which is set to YES if the information on taris before and after the Uruguay Round is available
for that country, and set to NO if taris data are available after the Uruguay Round only. When nothing is
specied, it means that we do not have any information on taris. However, the country is a French commercial
partner, since export ows at least for some rms in some products are dierent from 0.
C List of sectors
All the 3-digit NES manufacturing sectors included in the analysis:
Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products (BA);Manufacture of dairy products (BB); Manufacture of beverages(BC);
Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products, prepared animal feeds (BD); Manufacture of other food products (BE); Manufacture
of tobacco products (BF); Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur (CA); Manufacture of leather and leather products and footwear
(CB); Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (CC); Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products
(CD); Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations (CE); Manufacture of furniture
(CF); Manufacture of jewellery and musical instruments (CG); Manufacture of sports goods, games, toys and others n.e.c. (CH); Manufacture of
domestic appliances (CI); Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
(CJ); Manufacture of optical instruments, photographic equipment, watches and clocks (CK);Manufacture of motor vehicles, bodies and trailers (DA);
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles (DB); Building and repairing of ships and boats (EA); Manufacture of railway and tramway
locomotives and rolling stock (EB); Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft (EC); Manufacture of motorcycles, bicycles and other transport equipment
n.e.c. (ED); Manufacture of structural metal products (EE); Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs, containers of metal ; manufacture of central heating
radiators and boilers and steam generators (EF); Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical power (EG); Manufacture of
other general purpose machinery (EH); Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery (EI); Manufacture of machine tools (EJ); Manufacture
of other special purpose machinery (EK); Manufacture of weapons and ammunition (EL); Manufacture of oce machinery and computers (EM);
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers (EN); Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony
and line telegraphy (EO); Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances (EP); Manufacture of industrial process control
equipment, instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating (EQ); Mining of metal ores (FA); Other mining and quarrying
(FB); Manufacture of glass and glass products (FC); Manufacture of ceramic goods, products for construction purposes and other non-metallic mineral
products (FD); Preparation and spinning of textile bres, weaving and nishing of textiles (FE); Manufacture of textile articles, except apparel (FF);
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles (FG); Manufacture of wood and wood products (FH); Manufacture of pulp, paper and
paperboard (FI); Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard (FJ); Manufacture of basic inorganic chemicals (FK); Manufacture of basic organic
chemicals (FL); Manufacture of agro-chemical products, paints and other chemical products (FM); Manufacture of man-made bres (FN); Manufacture
of rubber products (FO); Manufacture of plastic products (FP); First processing of iron and steel (FQ); Manufacture of basic precious and non-
ferrous metals (FR); Manufacture of fabricated metal products (FU); Manufacture of electrical equipments and apparatus n.e.c. (FW); Manufacture
of electronic valves, tubes and other electronic components (FX).
23D Other regressions
We report Tables 9, 10, and 11 (corresponding respectively to Tables 4, 5, and 6). These regressions control
for the average world taris.47 There are three major observations to report. First, our main result on the
asymmetric eect of taris in the cross-section and in the panel, is conrmed here. Second, as we already noticed,
the eect on total exports may be downward biased (in absolute terms) when countries total openness is not
taken into account. This is conrmed here, since total export coecients are bigger than in the correspondent
regressions in the main text. Third, average world taris are most of the time insignicant, signalling the
absence of trade diversion. However, the eect on the extensive margin is sometimes negative, although only
marginally and very low. A plausible interpretation is that, by reducing average wordwide taris, a country
signals future opening (also towards the EU), inducing the entry of French rms in these markets for strategic
motives.
47The number of observations is dierent since average world taris are not available for all countries, sectors
and years.
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26Figures
Figure 1: Reduction of taris as a function of their initial levels
Source: TRAINS-WTO and authors' calculations.
Notes: The UR subset excludes observations for non-WTO member countries,
countries belonging to Mercosur and \Processed Agricultural" sectors.
Figure 2: Reduction in taris as a function of their initial levels for some selected countries
Source: TRAINS-WTO and authors' calculations.
Notes: The Philippines, Australia and Argentina are WTO members. Argentina is also a member of the
Mercosur. Vietnam has not participated in the Uruguay Round.
27Figure 3: Macroeconomic extensive margin
Source: Douanes data and authors' calculations.
Figure 4: Total and extensive margins, GDP and distance (2002)
GDP
Distance
Source: Douanes data, Penn World Tables, Andrew Rose's data and authors' calculations.
28Tables




Before 17.57 14.38 3.19**
UR (1) (16.70) (20.11) (1.47)
After 16.48 8.01 8.47***
UR (2) (12.55) (9.53) (0.72)
(1)-(2) 1.09 6.37*** -5.28***
(1.49) (0.44) (0.11)
Source: TRAINS-WTO and authors' calculations.
Notes: Taris for non WTO members have decreased by 1.09 percentage point but this number is not
signicant. For WTO members, taris have decreased by 6.37 p.p. and it is signicant. Taris in WTO
members decreased signicantly more in WTO members than in non WTO members.
Table 2: Growth rates of each margin between 1994 and 2001: Descriptive statistics
Margin Average s.d. s.d. with FE 10th percentile Median 90th percentile
Total 55% 1.25 1.16 -64% 48% 192%
Extensive 23% 0.45 0.39 -22% 18% 75%
Intensive 33% 1.11 1.05 -80% 28% 151%























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 4: Gravity equations with taris: within regressions
Dependent variable: Log of each trade margin
Total Extensive Intensive N. of observations
Panel A: Specication with Country-Year and Sector-Year FE (not within),
whole sample
ln(taris) -2.05*** -1.08*** -0.97*** 30,189
(0.11) (0.04) (0.09)
R2 0.90 0.97 0.71
Panel B: Specication with Sector-Year and Country-Sector FE (within), whole
sample
ln(taris) -0.13 0.03 -0.16 30,189
(0.12) (0.04) (0.10)
R2 0.94 0.97 0.84
Panel C: Specication with Country-Year and Sector-Year FE (not within), pre
and post UR sample
ln(taris) -1.79 *** -0.94*** -0.85*** 5,052
(0.30) (0.18) (0.27)
R2 0.82 0.90 0.64
Panel D: Specication with Country-Sector, Country-Year and Sector-Year FE
(within), pre and post UR sample
ln(taris) -1.99*** -0.18 -1.81*** 5,052
(0.47) (0.15) (0.43)
R2 0.94 0.98 0.84
***: signicant at the 1% level; **: signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
FE: Fixed Eects. Robust White standard errors are the ones reported in parentheses. The intercept and
the xed eects are not reported.
Table 5: Gravity equations with taris: models in dierence, IV regressions
1st stage Total Extensive Intensive No obs 1st-stage F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS, eq 4
ln(taris) -1.99*** -0.18 -1.81*** 2,526
(0.65) (0.17) (0.60)
R2 0.14 0.27 0.10
Panel B: 2SLS, eq 4, IV1
ln(taris) -0.56*** -2.56*** -0.22 -2.43** 2,526 F=140***
(0.012) (1.05) (0.23) (0.99)
R2 0.86 0.15 0.27 0.10
Panel C: 2SLS, eq 4, IV2
ln(taris) -0.52*** -1.78* 0.19 -1.97** 2,526 F=100***
(0.27) (1.06) (0.99) (0.95)
R2 0.81 0.15 0.27 0.10
***: signicant at the 1% level; **: signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
All regressions include country and sector dummies
Robust White standard errors are the ones reported in parentheses. The intercept and the xed eects are not reported.
Table 6: Tobit and Poisson specications
Tobit Poisson
Total Margin Extensive margin Total Margin Extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(tari) -2.97** -0.31* -2.31*** -0.44***
(1.41) (0.18) (0.00) (0.11)
Product   Country FE YES YES YES YES
Country   Y ear FE YES YES YES YES
Product   Y ear FE YES YES YES YES
Number observations 5,398 5,398 5,398 5,398
*: signicant at the 10% level, **: signicant at the 5% level, ***: signicant at the 1% level. FE = xed eects.
31Table 7: Summary of the main results : elasticity to taris
Total Extensive Intensive Number of observations
OLS (Panel C, Table 4) -1.79*** -0.94*** -0.85*** 5,052
OLS-within (Panel A, Table 5) -1.99*** -0.18 -1.81*** 2,526
IV-within (Panel C, Table 5 ) -1.78* 0.19 -1.97** 2,526
Tobit-within (Table 6 (1)-(2)) -2.78** -0.30* -2.48** 5,398
Poisson-within (Table 6 (3)-(4)) -2.31*** -0.44*** -1.87*** 5,398
Contribution (in %) 3.4-4.7 2.1-5.2 12.0-13.3
Table 8: List of countries
Code Country name Tari cov. Code Country name Tari cov. Code Country name Tari cov.
AE United Arab Emirates GW Guinea-Bissau no NZ New Zealand yes
AF Afghanistan HK Hong Kong, China OM Oman no
AL Albania no HN Honduras no PA Panama no
AR Argentina yes HR Croatia no PE Peru yes
AT Austria yes HT Haiti PG Papua New Guinea no
AU Australia yes HU Hungary no PH Philippines yes
BA Bosnia and Herzegovina no ID Indonesia yes PK Pakistan no
BD Bangladesh yes IE Ireland yes PL Poland no
BF Burkina Faso yes IL Israel no PT Portugal yes
BG Bulgaria no IN India no PY Paraguay yes
BH Bahrain no IR Iran, Islamic Rep. no QA Qatar no
BI Burundi no IQ Iraq RO Romania no
BJ Benin IT Italy yes RU Russian Federation yes
BO Bolivia yes JM Jamaica no RW Rwanda yes
BR Brazil yes JO Jordan no SA Saudi Arabia yes
BT Bhutan JP Japan yes SD Sudan no
BW Botswana no KE Kenya yes SE Sweden yes
CA Canada yes KG Kyrgyz Republic no SG Singapore no
CD Congo, Dem. Rep. KH Cambodia no SI Slovenia no
CF Central African Republic yes KP Korea, Dem. Rep. SK Slovak Republic no
CG Congo, Rep. yes KR Korea, Rep. no SL Sierra Leone
CI Cote d'Ivoire no KW Kuwait no SN Senegal no
CL Chile yes KZ Kazakhstan no SO Somalia
CM Cameroon yes LA Lao PDR no SV El Salvador no
CN China yes LB Lebanon no SY Syrian Arab Republic no
CO Colombia yes LK Sri Lanka yes SZ Swaziland
CR Costa Rica no LR Liberia TD Chad no
CU Cuba yes LS Lesotho TG Togo no
CY Cyprus no LT Lithuania no TH Thailand yes
CZ Czech Republic no LV Latvia no TJ Tajikistan
DE Germany yes MA Morocco yes TM Turkmenistan no
DK Denmark yes MD Moldova no TN Tunisia no
DO Dominican Republic no MG Madagascar no TR Turkey yes
DZ Algeria yes MK Macedonia, FYR no TT Trinidad and Tobago no
EC Ecuador yes ML Mali no TW Taiwan, China no
EE Estonia no MN Mongolia TZ Tanzania yes
EG Egypt, Arab Rep. no MR Mauritania no UA Ukraine no
ES Spain yes MU Mauritius no UG Uganda yes
ET Ethiopia(no Eritrea) no MW Malawi yes US United States yes
FI Finland yes MX Mexico no UY Uruguay no
FJ Fiji MY Malaysia yes UZ Uzbekistan no
GA Gabon no MZ Mozambique yes VE Venezuela no
GB United Kingdom yes NA Namibia no VN Vietnam yes
GE Georgia no NE Niger no XU Belgium and Luxemburg yes
GH Ghana yes NG Nigeria yes YE Yemen no
GM Gambia, The NI Nicaragua no YU Yugoslavia no
GN Guinea NL Netherlands yes ZA South Africa yes
GR Greece yes NO Norway yes ZM Zambia yes
GT Guatemala no NP Nepal yes ZW Zimbabwe no
32Table 9: Gravity equations with taris: within regressions
Dependent variable: Log of each trade margin
Total Extensive Intensive N. of observations
Panel A: Specication with Country-Year and Sector-Year FE (not within),
whole sample
ln(taris) -2.10*** -1.09*** -1.01*** 29,090
(0.11) (0.07) (0.13)
ln(average world taris) 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.00) (0.01)
R2 0.91 0.97 0.71
Panel B: Specication with Sector-Year and Country-Sector FE (within), whole
sample
ln(taris) 0.01 0.14** -0.13*** 29,090
(0.17) (0.06) (0.15)
ln(average world taris) -0.03 -0.03 -0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
R2 0.93 0.98 0.84
Panel C: Specication with Country-Year and Sector-Year FE (not within), pre
and post UR sample
ln(taris) -2.66*** -1.23*** -1.43*** 4,732
(0.45) (0.19) (0.38)
ln(average world taris) 0.00 -0.04 0.04
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04)
R2 0.83 0.91 0.66
Panel D: Specication with Country-Sector, Country-Year and Sector-Year FE
(within), pre and post UR sample
ln(taris) -2.08*** 0.01 -2.09*** 4,732
(0.60) (0.19) (0.54)
ln(average world taris) -0.00 -0.05* 0.05
(0.08) (0.02) (0.08)
R2 0.93 0.98 0.86
***: signicant at the 1% level; **: signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
FE: Fixed Eects. Robust White standard errors are the ones reported in parentheses. The intercept and
the xed eects are not reported.
Table 10: Gravity equations with taris: models in dierence, IV regressions
1st stage Total Extensive Intensive No obs 1st-stage F
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: OLS, eq 4
ln(taris) -2.08*** 0.02 -2.10*** 2,366
(0.85) (0.21) (0.79)
ln(average world taris) -0.00 -0.05* 0.05
(0.10) (0.03) (0.09)
R2 0.14 0.28 0.10
Panel B: 2SLS, eq 4, IV1
ln(taris) -0.48*** -3.60*** -0.22 -3.38*** 2,366 F=257***
(0.09) (1.21) (0.28) (1.16)
ln(average world taris) 0.13 -0.03* 0.16
(0.12) (0.03) (0.11)
R2 0.92 0.14 0.27 0.10
Panel C: 2SLS, eq 4, IV2
ln(taris) -0.48*** -2.74*** 0.20 -2.94*** 2,366 F=198***
(0.01) (1.03) (0.29) (0.93)
ln(average world taris) 0.05 -0.07* 0.12
(0.11) (0.03) (0.10)
R2 0.90 0.14 0.27 0.10
***: signicant at the 1% level; **: signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
All regressions include country and sector dummies
Robust White standard errors are the ones reported in parentheses. The intercept and the xed eects are not reported.
33Table 11: Tobit and Poisson specications
Tobit Poisson
Total Margin Extensive margin Total Margin Extensive margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(tari) -1.45 -0.05 -2.52*** -0.16
(1.76) (0.23) (0.00) (0.14)
ln(av world tari) -0.31 -0.06* 0.04*** -0.06***
(0.25) (0.03) (0.00) (0.02)
Product   Country FE YES YES YES YES
Country   Y ear FE YES YES YES YES
Product   Y ear FE YES YES YES YES
Number observations 4,916 4,916 4,916 4,916
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